21 February 2003
The mood on the streets of Baghdad is as volatile as oil prices these days — hyper when war seems inevitable, more relaxed as the prospect recedes. But if and when war does finally start, it’s the battle for Baghdad that is preoccupying everyone, Iraqis as much as foreign observers based in the Iraqi capital.
The recent global anti-war demonstrations astounded Iraqis to the point where they convinced themselves that the US would be forced to shelve its war plans. The public euphoria found an echo at the official level, with the daily Babel newspaper, owned by Saddam Hussein’s son, Uday, declaring that Iraq’s strategy is helping create a new multi-polar world. But countries leading the anti-war charge were quick to remind the Iraqi leadership that it should not confuse support for a peaceful end to the crisis with support for the regime itself.
Amid the fluctuating assessments of the likelihood of war, drivers on the streets of Baghdad confess that they are stocking up on gasoline to avoid running short. During the last Gulf War in 1991, the city came to a standstill after US missiles set the main refinery on fire, and it took 45 days to restore electricity and gasoline supplies.
Western diplomats based in Baghdad say the most likely US strategy would first be to bombard the symbols of the regime, such as ministry buildings, palaces, and army headquarters. At the same time, special forces would be sent in to control the northern, southern, and western borders, along with the northern Kirkuk and southern Basrah oil fields, with the goal of weakening Saddam. At a later stage, troops would move in on central Iraq, home to 60% of the Iraqi population, and Baghdad, which is where the real battle would take place, one diplomat says.
It might take some time for resistance to emerge. Depending on who you ask — how close they are to the regime — it appears that some would not be prepared to fight another war to defend Saddam, though they would fight a foreign occupying force.
Younger Iraqis who fought in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and were drafted again after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 say two wars in 20 years are more than enough. They are more openly critical of the regime. “Saddam Hussein built us the best of roads and highways, but a lot of injustices were done,” says one 38-year-old. “People disappeared over the years without a word of their whereabouts, others were assassinated on suspicions and not hard facts. We don’t know what freedom is like nor what the outside world looks like.”
The elite, which includes tens — if not hundreds — of thousands of Baath Party members, and former and current army officers, view their allegiance to Saddam in terms of their ideological adherence to the Baath Party and the material benefits they have accrued over the years. Their vested interests in the current regime and fear of the alternative dictate their hostility toward the US plans for regime change. Furthermore, like all Iraqis, they firmly believe the US objective is not letting Saddam so much as get a foot in the region and control of their oil. Unless they are overwhelmed by American troops, they would be forced to defend Baghdad in an attempt to preserve the status quo, analysts say.
Yet even they have become more openly critical of their president’s 24-year rule in recent months. While praising Saddam for the way he has given Iraq the best scientists in the Arab world and extraordinary military capabilities, they now talk privately about “mistakes” committed over the years, including the Iran-Iraq war and, above all, the invasion of Kuwait.
“The president is a genius, but the problem lies in his traditionalist bedouin mentality which dominates his foreign policy decisions. He responds to a provocation with a war,” says one Iraqi Baathist who participated in a coup attempt led by Saddam in 1964 for which they were both imprisoned until 1966.
While surprises can’t be ruled out in time of war, the level of resistance among Iraqis will depend on when and how the battle for Baghdad takes place, according to observers of the Iraqi domestic scene, including the amount of control still wielded by the regime, and whether internal infighting erupts simultaneously. Western diplomats in Baghdad warn of dire consequences if American troops become an army of occupation. “The worst mistake the Americans would commit would be to stay over once the current regime is eliminated,” one says. “Iraqis are very nationalistic, and the power vacuum would quickly instigate infighting over leadership. They will be rejected as an occupying force.”
Iraqis who dare contemplate an Iraq without Saddam agree. “No Iraqi would accept an American ruler running his life and issuing him with orders. Only another Iraqi leader is acceptable, even if he’s another Nuri al-Said,” says one outspoken young Iraqi, in reference to a former prime minister considered Britain’s man in Iraq — long after the British mandate ended — who was assassinated during the coup that overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
By Ruba Husari, Baghdad
(Published in Energy Compass February 21, 2003)